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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers an overview of the dual challenges involved with protecting Intellectual Property in the 
distribution of valuable business information that needs to be read and acted upon by others. We 
introduce IPCRESS as a means to engender trust in an inherently deperimeterized supply chain likely 
acting through the Cloud, discuss the context and requirements of such a system, and in relation to a 
potentially familiar application domain of plagiarism detection show how that an approach which does 
not content can be used effectively to find similar content (precision: 0.88) whilst having some robustness 
to obfuscation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Coherently managed document archives of any organization could contain a variety of high-
value information around business transactions, research, technical development, market 
analysis and strategy. This can exist in and across siloed business units, with disparate systems, 
approaches, and evolved practices. Careful curation can be costly and enforced change poorly 
received. Custodians may impose constraints that actively impede progress and lead to 
unconstrained workarounds, encouraging new problems. But free-flowing communication, often 
across legislative borders, presents a risk to such archives. Such free-flowing communication is 
essential when organizations are not self-sufficient – i.e. when they act in supply chains – and 
communication and especially accidental communication can readily flow bi-directionally. 
Recipient recommendation, without checking, is but one way in which accidents happen [1]. Of 
interest for this paper is that deperimeterization, the lack of a readily definable organizational 
boundary, is inherent in Supply Chains, and especially inherent in Supply Chains acting through 
the Cloud. It is the deperimeterization that presents risks, not least to Intellectual Property. Costs 
of such risks have been reported at £9.2bn annually for the UK (OCSIA/Detica report) with the 
notion that insider assistance is typical, and as high as $300bn annually as mooted for the US 
(National Bureau of Asian Research study) which identified issues with protection when dealing 
with specific nations. An important question for a Supply Chain is: who is an insider? This 
should be easily answered until one considers that companies who tender unsuccessfully for 
work may have been privy to information about the work to be done and may have learnt from 
it in order to offer to supply similar to others. This offers potential for less scrupulous suppliers 
to win business with others and deliberately or inadvertently to end up supplying a very similar 
component. Aside from self-destructing documents, checks that such suppliers have destroyed 
correspondence when unsuccessful are difficult to make, and if detecting such leakage is quite a 
challenge; acting on such a leakage is even more so.  
In a collaborative research and development project between Jaguar Land Rover, University of 
Surrey, and GeoLang Ltd, and with funding from the UK government-backed Technology 
Strategy Board for 18 months, we are constructing the Intellectual Property Protecting Cloud 
Services in Supply Chains (IPCRESS) system to address Supply Chains and barriers to Cloud 
adoption related to data security and resilience. The focus for IPCRESS is this difficulty of 
entrusting valuable Intellectual Property (IP) to third parties, through the Cloud, as is necessary 
to allow for the construction of components in the supply chain: such information needs to be 
readily readable and usable by suppliers so that they can see what to build and understand vital 
properties of the things being built, and so encryption-based approaches can become, at best, 
inconvenient; at worst, they will encourage removal of protection through transformations of 
the received information into forms that avoid such inconvenience. IPCRESS is developing the 
capability for tracking IP through supply chains, built around Surrey’s private search approach 
to plagiarism detection which is suited to tracking IP without revealing IP (US patent filed 
November 2011; PCT filed November 2012). Such tracking is suited to the tasks of (i) 
preventing IP leakage; (ii) detecting IP leakage or theft; and (iii) identifying retention beyond 
allowed review periods.  
Discussions around such a system and its uses have been presented previously [2]. In this paper, 
we offer an overview of the IPCRESS context (Section 2), expected formulation of the system 
(Section 3), and information regarding the operation of the approach (Section 4) and its 
evaluation (Section 5).We conclude by speculating on the potential business value of adopting 
such a system. 
2. THE IPCRESS CONTEXT 
Protection of IP rights (IPR) is critical to the presence and growth of business activities. Nations 
in Western Europe, the US, Japan and Singapore have well-established regulations with 
stringent and enforceable rules for IP protection. Many emerging economies recognize that this 
is vital to attract and maintain foreign investment, so Malaysia, Hungary, India, and China also 
begin to craft legislation to improve IP protection standards. But tracking IP across companies 
in these nations where each has different considerations to make with respect to IP remains a 
significant problem. Particularly for IP-heavy industries, an innovative IP tracking system to 
monitor data across multiple silos without incurring high costs of manual curation or risking 
loss of IP in the process is appealing. Consider, for example, the automotive industry. About 65-
70% of products are typically designed and engineered in the supply chain1. As an exemplar of 
this industry, Jaguar Land Rover has several UK sites and several off-shore sites to actively take 
production to emerging markets, and although focus on IP generation is in the UK, it must be 
trusted first amongst these sites and from there to suppliers for these sites. Locations of 
suppliers, then, become important, as do the embedded information security approaches. 
Technological ‘solutions’ typically take the view of securing organisational borders, which 
don’t really exist here, then the network - reinforcing a ‘perimeterised’ perspective. Moreover it 
would assume that it is possible to control all technologies, and indeed people, at all points of 
the supply chain. All of this can be somewhat at odds with business needs: business R&D 
strategies demand more connectivity outside the enterprise. However, mistrust and 
perimeterisation will become the norm across industries that suffer most from IP theft. Our aim, 
then, is to offer a means of safer deperimeterisation whilst fostering recognition of IP value 
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 Henry, I. (2011), ‘The UK Automotive Industry:  Invest now’, AutoAnalysis: 
http://www.nudgeadvisory.com/assets/uploaded/downloads/The_UK_Automotive_Industry_Invest_Now.
pdf 
across the supply chain. Such an environment could facilitate new and lucrative manufacturing 
and development partnerships and consequently enable confident utilisation of cloud 
technologies.  
A system such as IPCRESS should help to encourage similar levels of respect for IP even where 
local legal systems for IP are poor, or cultural importance is lacking. Clearly elaborated 
operational protocols are required which, allied to software-based tracking methods, act to deter 
opportunistic industrial theft and become off-putting to an ‘insider’. IPCRESS will develop a 
capability for tracking IP through supply chains, offering Cloud services to (i) prevent IP 
leakage; (ii) detect IP leakage, or theft; and (iii) identify information retention beyond allowed 
periods. The approach to be trialled within Jaguar Land Rover is based on a computationally 
efficient method for finding IP without exposing IP, referred to as private search, but with an 
additional novelty (US patent filed by the University of Surrey) of avoiding costs of encryption. 
To act effectively, the system would need to account for the following requirements: 
1. scale to the entire (potentially deep) web: information as leaked straight out ‘to 
public’ would need to be traced. This requires a system that can process such 
information efficiently.  
2. be used against (private) corporate resources: information within a corporate must 
first be indexed. Care must, of course, be taken with such an index since it also, in 
theory at least, contains a trace of the valuable information and, indeed, likely of rather 
more valuable information, in pulling together all such information of value, than would 
ever be shared in any individual interaction. 
3. be used across (private) corporates: the key challenge, since it requires corporates to 
be willing to share their indexes, which, from 2 above, may include trace of all their 
valuable information, whilst still unwilling to share actual content. This places a 
specific on the index not being a route to revealing the content – this is the key novelty 
of the approach being embedded into IPCRESS, and which helps to satisfy 1 and 2 here. 
4. be built in and for ‘the Cloud’: if we have achieved, in particular, 3, the entire system 
and all of the produced corporate indexes could be deployed in ‘the Cloud’ to allow for 
scalable processing. 
The system needs to be responsive – ideally, operating for queries at the speed of search (1) – 
and should be usable directly within an organization (2) for ‘private search’ – for us, the ability 
to find information without exposing the queries being used, and hence not leaking information 
through any other exposure (3). 
The approach shares some similarities with a Federated Search capability across different 
instances of the same Enterprise Content Management (ECM) system. In a Federated Search 
approach, the same query – likely a few keywords - is presented to each individual instance of 
the system, and results are presented in a single page but partitioned according to instances 
searched. A user at any of the locations can search for content in any of the instances exposed 
this way. Each instance maintains its own search index across the underlying server farm that 
hosts the documents, generally to support querying, and the Federated Search consolidates 
efforts that would be needed to separately search each instance. However, this is a product-
specific approach – most likely locked-in to a single vendor - for a distributed large enterprise, 
where full access is likely to be granted to content across the Federation and where the cost of 
maintenance of multiple geographically distributed instances is easier to justify than attempting 
to produce a single monolithic system with concomitant difficulties associated to latency and 
bandwidth. Relevance ranking is provided with respect to the query issued for each separate 
instance rather than a consolidated ranking being offered. In IPCRESS, we consider the 
Federation as being across enterprises, and the query comprises the patterns generated from 
entire documents. With this external-first view, the approach should also be readily suited to 
search within an organisation. And so, for a given document, all documents containing 
matching segments from both inside and outside the organisation should be identifiable. 
Companies can then manage and protect such materials internally, using this as a means to 
bootstrap such provision and assist in confidentiality marking of documents. 
3. ADDRESSING THE IPCRESS REQUIREMENTS 
We consider the implications around the first 3 of the 4 requirements of the IPCRESS system, 
discussed briefly in the previous section, and the relationship this has to common systems for 
plagiarism detection, in the remainder of this section.  
3.1. Private search in Public (Req.1) 
Public content, here web texts, need to be composable into an index produced in a manner 
consistent with the approach for internal resources. Matches are made against patterns, with 
ranking by largest extent of match. This can offer a similar capability to a search engine, but one 
in which complete (but private) documents are the query, rather than a few clear text keywords. 
The actual content of the private documents never leaves the organisation in this process, 
having only been involved in pattern production; moreover, the matching system need retain 
no trace of patterns matched against. Consider, for example, a user with a document open in 
a common Word Processing application on a laptop. They have available to them a menu bar 
offering one initial button – ‘Private Search’. On pressing this button, the pattern production 
process takes place on this laptop (within the Word Processing application). The patterns 
produced, and only the patterns, are exchanged with the server. The server finds all instances of 
these patterns in its index and collects associated document identifiers. Results are ranked by 
frequency of occurrence of the document identifiers. The Word Processing application retrieves 
the list of matches (alarms) which can be explored adjacent to the existing document. 
Documents of interest to the user would then, and only then, be retrieved, with matching 
segments in documents aligned for inspection post-retrieval. A simple alarm, for one document, 
could carry the following initial information:  
1. an identifier for the source document; 
2. web address (URL) of matching document – to allow retrieval;  
3. extent of match by proportion;  
4. title, description, and other useful metadata of the matching document 
For inspection, following retrieval, the following are also needed:  
5. list of fragments of document involved in match – to able to view sections involved 
with the match without yet needing to retrieve the matching document -  including, for 
each match fragment: (i) start and end location of fragment in source document; (ii) 
start and end location of fragment in matching document 
3.2. Private search internally (Req.2) 
Full archive match would operate similarly, but in relation to full indexes –potentially one per 
business unit - already produced, likely as background processing. The approach is inherently 
similar, but without the involvement of Word Processor software - more likely, with index 
generation operating in close technical proximity to the Enterprise Content Management 
system. Subsequent investigation of matches of significant concern – document segments in 
business units that might not be expected, for example the very latest and most technical 
innovations being near to ‘press releases’. Internal private search helps to demonstrate external 
operation, and enables tracking of the IP through the organisation. This may also imply 
indexing and matching within the email system and any other collaborative platform.  
 
3.3. Private search across Privates (Req.3) 
As above, matches are made against indexes, with ranking by largest extent of match. Again, 
the capability is similar to a search engine, with full (but private) documents as the query. Here, 
the actual content of the private documents being matched never leaves any of the organisations 
and again the matching system need retain no trace of patterns matched against. 
Most importantly, when a match in private content is detected an alarm is generated 
multilaterally to inform all parties to which it is relevant of a potential concern. But the 
matching content is not revealed at this stage. The information identified as being carried with 
an alarm varies as follows:  
1. instead of URL, a supply chain member identifier and document id is provided – to 
assist in investigations;  
2. title, description, and other useful metadata of the matching document is not made 
available to either party – indeed, each organisation’s metadata may need authorised 
access before they can even see which files are implicated on their own side. 
Having received such an alarm, investigation is now required by all implicated parties. This 
necessitates the description of a protocol for investigation. Such a protocol could involve, for 
example, a mediation process, or the exposure of smaller fragments implicated in the match that 
still do not reveal the critical content – for example, by redaction and selective revealing. 
Though a potentially very effective technical approach, it cannot be adopted readily without 
cross-organisational agreement and buy-in, and so the protocol for investigation will become a 
key dependency as the project progresses.  
4. OPERATION OF THE IPCRESS APPROACH 
The need to search for sections of documents as are re-used would immediately suggest the use 
of existing approaches for copy detection (which some may equate narrowly to plagiarism 
detection systems). These perform reasonably, reliant on the extent of coverage of their indexes, 
across documents of which all the content is readily readable – i.e. when the queries and texts 
can be exposed in entirety. For efficiency reasons, the index is likely formed of n-grams, hashes, 
or encrypted data – n-grams mean the documents could be reconstituted if document id and n-
gram position are known; hashing and encryption both add processing costs, but consistency 
requires the hash or encrypted value to be reasonably unique – and particularly for hashing, data 
similarity does not mean hash similarity: a one character difference will change the hash value 
quite significantly. Relative uniqueness, and access to keys, as well as access to the same 
hashing approach, means that such techniques, whilst offering potential look-up efficiency in an 
index, are unlikely to be worth the processing cost. Indeed, typical techniques for plagiarism 
detection will readily fail the first three of our requirements. 
Addressing the requirements means that it must not be readily possible to reverse-engineer the 
document, or to be able to achieve this by knowing the approach and the simple expedient of 
brute force. Such a system will work well if it is possible to generate many possible inputs for a 
single pattern (an ‘ambiguous hash’ has been suggested as a means to refer to this), and if hash 
proximity/similarity and data similarity have a closer relationship. In addition, reasonable 
detection performance must be assured at speed, and so linguistic processing (part of speech 
tagging) approaches are also mitigated against. The patented approach does, we believe, meet 
such requirements. For a set of documents, we are able to convert the plain text of each 
document to a set of (statistically almost irreversible) patterns, and insert these patterns into an 
index (pattern as key, value as document and pattern start position. Such an index can readily be 
sharded by key to allow for scaling. Consider a simplified example source index where a key is 
assigned to a specific text pattern (it would be repeated if the pattern is found in other 
documents). The index would be of the form [key, document, position]:  
001, 1, 75  002, 1, 84  003, 1, 99  004, 2, 2574  005, 2, 2599 
 
The approach to detection is similar. For a document of interest [d], another index is produced, 
although for a single document we need not be concered about its id. Matches in the indexes are 
generated from the same key production process. Each detection returns only the pair of 
document id and position, so sorting on document and then position, and subsequently 
identifying the document with the most detections and addressing the nature of the overlapping 
positions, helps to compose the results.  
So, if d returned all the examples above, documents 1 and 2 are of interest with matching 
segments spanning 75, 84, 99 and 2574, 2599. Segment sizes depend on the length of encoded 
data, so if we assumed a 14-gram (14 word segment), for document 1 we have a continuous 
segment from words 75-113. For document 2, however, there is a gap between the 2 segments. 
Here we can use a notion of a stitch distance, allied to a confidence value relative to the length 
of the stitch, such that we retain just one continuous segment from 2574-2613, but with a 
slightly lowered match confidence [here, 10 words are missing, so we could say 30 plus 10 x 
4/14 to account for the stitchable distance] of (about) 33 vs 39. So, documents would remain 
ordered 1, 2. The combination of an ambiguous pattern production approach, and a confidence 
weighting for missing detections, helps to overcome some obfuscation.  
One key generation approach for plagiarism detection is to use MD5hash. Suppose that we 
break each document into 5-grams that overlap by 2 words, and produce a hash value for each: 
• the quick brown fox jumped  e0c19dedd2e35a44b70ca531144ac953 
• fox jumped over the lazy  842ff3fabd7032a95c5cd5cc919a7e6b 
• the lazy dog and cat  2b4032a8f7fa15aa933dd916e93cf8d2 
These positions would be ‘1’, ‘4’, ‘7’. Key length is ‘5’, so if the second pattern went 
undetected (somebody changes ‘over’ to ‘across’ in their document, which results in an entirely 
different hash value), a stitch distance of 1 would allow for a continuous segment to be reported 
albeit with a slightly lower confidence. It should be apparent how brittle such a hash-based 
approach is. Somebody wishing to avoid detection would need change only 2 words (e.g. 
‘jumped’, ‘lazy’ to ‘jumps’, ‘tired’) and none of the resulting hashes would be matchable. To 
see the effect of this, consider switching dog  dogs in the third 5-gram. This results in a hash 
of f15f022792db93722733b4b5b2b6f548. Our approach does not suffer this (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Fragment of a matching suspicious document (above) and source (below) from PAN 
(see next section), showing robustness to variations in both lexical selection and spelling. 
Furthermore, with common n-gram patterns available from Google and Microsoft for research 
purposes, such approaches have even greater brute-forceability. Imagine, now, that many n-
grams produce the same (ambiguous) hash, and the value of the approach should be clearer. 
5. EVALUATION OF THE IPCRESS APPROACH - PAN 
The Uncovering Plagiarism, Authorship, and Social Software Misuse (PAN) activity first 
appeared in 2007. The external detection part of the plagiarism detection task, where external 
refers to matching to source texts that are also available, changed markedly in 2012 from a prior 
moderate-sized index comparison to two tasks: i) a retrieval of documents from a search engine 
as might be useful in match; ii) a matching between given pairs of documents. Offering a search 
engine for the first of these avoids the need for those who have struggled to construct an 
efficient index with a few gigabytes of text to struggle further with terabytes. However, 
common search engines work best for plagiarism detection with long quoted phrases, although 
the offered search system does not. Further, this means presenting segments of the text in-clear 
to the search system, which doesn’t readily fit with our context. We focus here on results 
obtained for ii) in 2012 and 2013, with a brief view of results in 2011 by way of contrast.  
 
In Cooke et al (2011) we described various aspects of our system as used for the external 
plagiarism detection task, which could process the entire PAN11 collection within relatively 
short timescales without requiring a specialized computer cluster, and which was still able to 
produce a reasonable degree of matching performance (4th place, with PlagDet=0.2467329, 
Recall=0.1500480, Precision=0.7106536, Granularity=1.0058894). In 2012, we again showed 
good granularity (at or near 1, meaning that the same passage is not indicated multiple times) 
with high recall and precision for non-obfuscated text. A beneficial side-effect is that some 
obfuscation is handled by the same approach, but additional efforts need to be focused on 
obfuscation to offer a truly robust system.  
 
Test Plagdet 
Score 
Recall Precision Granularity 
02_no_obfuscation 0.92530 0.90449 0.94709 1.0 
03_artificial_low 0.09837 0.05374 0.93852 1.04688 
04_artificial_high 0.01508 0.00867 0.96822 1.20313 
06_simulated_paraphrase 0.11229 0.05956 0.97960 1.0 
 
In 2013, apart from for non-obfuscated data, descriptions of the nature of data used seem also to 
have shifted from the previous year. Our precision and granularity figures remain high, but it is 
difficult to conclude anything with regard to performance comparison for the other tasks – and 
prior examples of random obfuscation (see examples in [3]) suggest that this is not a realistic 
problem worth focusing on.  
 
Test Plagdet 
Score 
Recall Precision Granularity 
02_no_obfuscation 0.85884 0.83788 0.88088 1.0 
03_random_obfuscation 0.04191 0.02142 0.95968 1.0 
04_translation_obfuscation 0.01224 0.00616 0.97273 1.0 
05_summary_obfuscation 0.00218 0.00109 0.99591 1.0 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Widespread adoption of a system such as IPCRESS could engender a culture of IP protection, 
irrespective of the sharpness of the legal teeth in any particular jurisdiction, and offer an ability 
to address an apparent security risk (one of the four categories of supply chain risks [4]: supply, 
demand, operational and security) through information sharing of an over-eager or careless 
nature. It is likely in the interests of companies to adopt such a system, but assurances are vital 
in order to engender trust in its operation. And, in fact, the reputation of members of supply 
chains could be enhanced by a trustmark allied to a relative lack of identified IP issues, or be 
drawn substantially into question where unresolved issues have leave to remain. The means by 
which such issues are identified, and the process towards resolution is another important aspect 
of the processes and procedures for IPCRESS, but is still to be defined. IPCRESS must be 
acceptable to adopt, and enforceable by contract within the supply chain in order to be 
successful. Of course, if such a system can be adopted in one supply chain, it is more likely to 
be adopted across all supply chains that involve each party. The view of supply chains as of 
sequences of producer/consumer relationships, akin to food chains, does not account for the 
complex reality of many supply chains. These can be variously interconnected with the same 
organisation acting many times on both sides of the supposed divide, and with larger 
organisations readily acting as suppliers to smaller ones. Larger companies in these supply 
chains would be readily positioned for such a scale of adoption. 
Although the present approach works well, better treatment of obfuscation is likely an essential 
additional ingredient for adoption. The open publication of data, as here, regarding evaluations 
can only be helpful in trying to achieve this, and the strength/lossy nature of pattern production 
is readily demonstrable by Gedankenexperiment to private audiences, and is fully described in 
the patent filing. Where organisations were to agree on such an undertaking, exposure of the 
organisational archives to the pattern production process is the vital step, which presents a new 
but minor risk to information security: the pattern production process is one-way, but as with 
any such processing requires, temporarily, full access to unencrypted (clear text) document 
content. Such processing should ideally be undertaken in a network-isolated or security 
assertion enforcing system so as to assure the organisations that their document content cannot 
be leaked during such processing. The resulting index can also be visually inspected prior to 
release to increase the degree of assurance, and the mechanism for release should be relatively 
constrained also. Indeed, a vital effort in IPCRESS is to craft the set of acceptable processes and 
procedures for deploying IPCRESS and identifying associated risk levels in relation to 
information assurance. Related processes and procedures, including the drafting contractual 
terms for such an adoption, are also required. 
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